U.S. Telecommunications Today, April 1999 by Economides, Nicholas
Forthcoming, Handbook of IS Management.





This short essay examines the current conditions in the US telecommunications sector
(April 1999).  We examine the impact of technological and regulatory change on market
structure and business strategy.  Among others, we examine the impact on pricing of
digitization and the emergence of i t rnet telephony.  We briefly examine the impact of the
1996 Telecommunications Act on market structure and strategy in conjunction with the
history of regulation and antitrust intervention in the telecommunications sector.  After
discussing the impact of wireless technologies, we conclude by venturing into some short
term predictions.  We express concern about the derailment of the implementation of the
1996 Act by the aggressive legal tactics of the entrenched monopolists (the local exchange
carriers), and we point to the real danger that the intent of Congress in passing the 1996
Act to promote competition in telecommunications will not be realized.  We also discuss
the wave of mergers in the Telecommunications and cable industries.
* Some of this article is based on “US Telecommunications Today,” Bu iness Economics,
April 1998.
** Stern School of Business, New York, NY 10012.  E-mail: neconomi@stern.nyu.edu.
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1. Introduction
Presently, the US Telecommunications sector is going through a revolutionary
change.  There are three reasons for this.  The first reason is the rapid technological
change in key inputs of telecommunications services and in complementary goods, which
have reduced dramatically the costs of traditional services and have made many new
services available at reasonable prices.   Cost reductions have made feasible the world
wide web (“WWW”), and the various multimedia applications that “live” on it.
The second reason for the revolutionary change has been the sweeping digitization
of the telecommunications and the related sectors.  The underlying telecommunications
technology has become digital. Moreover, the consumer and business telecommunications
interfaces have become more versatile and closer to multifunction computers than to
traditional telephones.  Digitization, and integration of telecommunications services with
computers creates significant business opportunities and imposes significant pressure on
traditional pricing structures, especially in voice telephony.
The third reason for the current upheaval in the telecommunications sector was the
passage of a major new law to govern telecommunications in the US, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”).  Telecommunications has been
traditionally subject to a complicated Federal and State regulatory structure.  The 1996
Act attempted to adapt the regulatory structure to technological reality, but various legal
challenges by the incumbents have so far delayed, if not nullified, its impact.
Before going into a detailed analysis, it is important to point out the major driving
forces in US telecommunications today.
21. Dramatic reductions in the costs of transmission and switching.
2. Digitization.
3. Restructuring of the regulatory environment through the implementation of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act coming twelve years after the breakup
of AT&T.
4. Move of value from underlying services (such as transmission and
switching) to the interface and content.
5. Move toward multi-function programmable devices with programmable
interfaces, such as computers, and away from single-function, non-
programmable consumer devices, such as traditional telephone appliances.
6. Re-allocation of electromagnetic spectrum, allowing for new types of
wireless competition.
7. Interconnection and interoperability of interconnected networks;
standardization of communications protocols.
8. Network externalities and critical mass.
These forces have a number of consequences:
1. Increasing pressure for cost-based pricing of telecommunications services.
2. Price arbitrage between services of the same time immediacy requirement.
3. Increasing competition in long distance services.
4. The possibility of competition in local services.
5. The emergence of internet telephony as a major new telecommunications
technology.
3This short essay will touch on technological change and its implications in the next
section.  In section 3, I discuss the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its implications.
In section 4, I discuss the impact of wireless.  In section 5, I make some predictions and
short term forecasts for the US telecommunications sector.
2. Technological Change
The last two decades have witnessed (i) dramatic reductions in costs of
transmission through the use of technology; (ii) reductions in costs of switching and
information processing because of big reductions of costs of integrated circuits and
computers; and (iii) very significant improvements in software interfaces.  Cost reductions
and better interfaces have made feasible many data- and transmission-intensive services.
These include many applications on the w rld wide web, which were dreamed of many
years ago, but only now became economically feasible.
The general trend in cost reductions has allowed for entry of more competitors in
many components of the telecommunications network and an intensification of
competition.  Mandatory interconnection of public telecommunications networks, and the
use of common standards for interconnection and interoperability created a “network of
networks,” that is, a web of interconnected networks.  The open architecture of the
network of networks allowed for entry of new competitors in markets for particular
components, as well as in markets for integrated end-to-end services.  Competition
intensified in many, but not all, markets.
2.1 Digital Convergence and “Bit Arbitrage”
4Entry and competition were particularly helped by (i) the open architectur  of the
network; and (ii) its increasing digitization.  Currently, all voice messages are digitized
close to their origination and are carried in digital form over most of the network.  Thus,
the data and voice networks are one, with voice treated as data with specific time
requirements.  This has important implications on pricing and market structure.
Digital bits (zeros or ones) traveling on the information highway can be parts of
voice, still pictures, video, or of a database or other computer application, and they appear
identical, “a bit is a bit is a bit.”  However, because some demands are for real-time
services while others are not, the saying that “a bit is a bit is a bit” is only correct among
services that have the same index of time immediacy.  Digitization implies arbitrage on the
price of bit transmission among services that have the same time immediacy requirements.
For example, voice telephony and video conferencing require real-time
transmission and interaction.  Digitization implies that the cost of transmission of voice is
hundreds of times smaller than the cost of transmitting video of the same duration.  This
implies that if regulatorily-imposed price discrimination is eliminated, arbitrage on the
price of bits will occur, leading to extremely low prices for services, such as voice, that
use relatively very few bits.  Even if price discrimination remains imposed by regulation,
arbitrage in the cost and pricing of bits will lead to pressures for a de facto elimination of
discrimination.  This creates significant profit opportunities for the firms that are able to
identify the arbitrage opportunities and exploit them.
2.2 Internet Telephony
5The elimination of price discrimination between voice and data services can lead to
dramatic reductions in the price of voice calls precipitating significant changes in market
structure.  These changes were first evident in the emergence of the Internet, a ubiquitous
network of applications based on the TCPIP protocol.  Started as a text-based network
for scientific communication, the Internet grew dramatically in the late 80s and 90s, once
not-text-only applications became available.1 The Internet now reaches about half a billion
computers, most of which are connected to it through the telephone network.  Internet-
based telecommunications are based on packet switching.  There are two modes of
operation: (i) a time-delay mode in which there is a guarantee that system will do whatever
it can to deliver all packets; and (ii) a real-time mode, in which packets can in fact be lost
without possibility of recovery.
Most telecommunications services do not have a real time requirement, so
applications that “live” on the Internet can easily accommodate them.  For example, there
are currently a number of companies that provide facsimile services of the Internet, where
all or part of the transport of the fax takes place over the Internet.  Although the Internet
was not intended to be used in real-time telecommunications, despite the loss of packets,
presently telecommunications companies use the Internet to complete ordinary voice
telephone calls.  Voice telecommunications service started on the Internet as a computer
to computer call.  As long as Internet telephony was confined to calls from a PC to a PC,
it failed to take advantage of the huge network externalities of the public switched
network (“PSTN”) and was just a hobby.
                                         
1 Critical points in this development were the emergence of GOPHER in the late 80s and MOSAIC
by 1990.
6About four years ago, Internet telecommunications companies started offering
termination of calls on the public switched network, thus taking advantage of the immense
externalities of reaching anyone on the PSTN.  In 1996, firms started offering Internet
calling that originated and terminated on the public switched network, i.e., from and to the
regular customers’ phone appliances.  The last two transitions became possible with the
introduction of PSTN-Internet interfaces and switches by Lucent and others.  In 1998,
Qwest and others started using the Internet Protocol (“IP”) switching to carry telephone
calls from and to the PSTN using their own network for long distance transport as an
Intranet.
Internet calls are packet based. Because they utilize the real time mode of the
Internet, there is no guarantee that all the packets of a voice transmission will arrive to the
destination.  Internet telephony providers use sophisticated voice sampling methods to
decompose and reconstitute voice so that packet losses do not make a significant audible
difference.  Since such methods are by their nature imperfect, the quality and fidelity of an
Internet call depends crucially on the percentage of packets that are lost in transmission
and transport.  This, in turn, depends, among other factors,  (i) on the allocation of
Internet bandwidth (pipeline) to the phone call; and (ii) on the number of times the
message is transmitted.2  Because of these considerations, one expects that two types of
                                         
2 A large enough bandwidth increases the probability that fewer packets will be lost.  And, if each
packet is send a number of times, it is much more likely that each packet will arrive at the destination at
least once, and the quality of the phone call will not deteriorate.  Thus, the provider can adjust the quality
level of an i ternet call by guaranteeing a lot of bandwidth for the transmission, and by sending the
packets more than once.  This implies that the quality of an internet c ll is variable and can be adjusted
upward using the variables mentioned.  Thus, high quality voice telephony is immediately feasible in
intranets since intranets can guarantee a sustained large enough bandwidth.  There is no impediment to
the quality level of a phone call which is picked from the PSTN at the local switch, carried over long
distance on leased lines, and re-delivered to the PSTN at the destination local switch, using the recently
introduced Lucent switches.  For internet calls that originate or terminate in computers,  the method of re-
7Internet telephony will survive.  First, the low end quality, carried over the Internet, with
packets lost and low fidelity.  Second, a service of comparable quality with traditional long
distance, carried on a company’s Intranet on the long distance part.
Internet-based telecommunications services pose a serious threat to traditional
national and international long distance service providers.  In the traditional US regulatory
structure, a call originating from a computer to an Internet service provider (“ISP”) (or
terminating from an ISP to a computer) is not charged an “access charges” by the local
exchange carrier.  This can lead to substantial savings.
FCC, in its decision of February 25, 1999, muddles the waters by finding that
“Internet traffic is intrinsically mixed and appears to be largely interstate in nature” on the
one hand, while, on the other hand, it validates the reciprocal compensation of ISPs which
were made under the assumption that customer calls to ISPs are treated as local calls.  If
Internet calls are classified as interstate (i.e., as long distance data calls), the price that
most consumers will have to pay to reach the Internet would become a significant per
minute change and it is likely that the Internet will stop its fast growth.  In fact, one of the
key reasons for Europe’s lag in Internet adoption is the fact the in most countries, unlike
the US, consumers are charged per minute for local calls.
In response to the Internet telephony threat, on January 26, 1998, AT&T
announced that it will offer a new long distance service carried over the Internet and
AT&T’s Intranet.  AT&T’s service offered at 7.5-9 cents per minute, will originate and
terminate on the public switched network (“PSTN”) and therefore will appear to
                                                                                                                   
sending packets can be used on the Internet to increase the quality of the phone call, as long as there is
sufficient bandwidth between the computer and the local telephone company switch.  The fidelity of calls
8customers like regular call; no computer will be required.  In November 1997, Deutsche
Telecom (“DT”) introduced Internet long distance service within Germany.  To
compensate for the lower quality of voice transmission, DT offers i ternet long distance at
1/5 of its regular long distance rates.  Internet telephony is the most important challenge to
the telecommunications sector.
3. The 1996 Telecommunications Act and its Impact
3.1 Goals of the Act
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 attempts a major restructuring of the US
telecommunications sector.  The 1996 Act will be judged favorably to the extent that it
allows and facilitates the acquisition by consumers of the benefits of technological
advances.  Such a function requires the promotion of competition in all markets.  This
does not mean immediate and complete deregulation.  Consumers must be protected from
monopolistic abuses in some markets as long as such abuses are feasible under the current
market structure.  Moreover, the regulatory framework must safeguard against firms
exporting their monopoly power in other markets.
In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”) Congress took
radical steps to restructure U.S. telecommunications markets.  These steps may result in
very significant benefits to consumers of telecommunications services, telecommunications
carriers, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers.  But the degree of success of
the 1996 Act depends crucially on its implementation through decisions of the Federal
                                                                                                                   
can also be enhanced by manipulation of the sound frequencies.  This can be done, for example, through
the elemedia series of products by Lucent.
9Communication Commission and State Public Utility Commissions and the outcome of the
various court challenges that these decisions face.
The 1996 Act envisions a network of interconnected networks that are composed
of complementary components and generally provide both competing and complementary
services.  The 1996 Act uses both tructural and behavioral instruments to accomplish its
goals.  The Act attempts to reduce regulatory barriers to entry and competition.  It
outlaws artificial barriers to entry in local exchange markets, in its attempt to accomplish
the maximum possible competition.  Moreover, it mandates interconnection of
telecommunications networks, unbundling, non-discrimination, and cost-based pricing of
leased parts of the network, so that competitors can enter easily and compete component
by component and service by service.
The 1996 Act imposes conditions to ensure that de facto monopoly power is not
exported to vertically-related markets.  Thus, the Act requires that competition be
established in local markets before the incumbent local exchange carriers are allowed in
long distance.
The Act preserves subsidized local service to achieve “Universal Service,” but
imposes the requirement that subsidization is transparent and that subsidies are raised in a
competitively neutral manner.  Thus, the Act leads the way to the elimination of
subsidization of Universal Service through the traditional method of high access charges.
The 1996 Act crystallized changes that had become necessary because of
technological progress.  Rapid technological change has always been the original cause of
regulatory change.  The radical transformation of the regulatory environment and market
conditions that is presently taking place as a result of the 1996 Act is no exception.
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3.2 History
Telecommunications has traditionally been a regulated sector of the US economy.
Regulation was imposed in the early part of this century and remains until today in various
parts of the sector.3  The main idea behind regulation was that it was necessary because
the market for telecommunications services was a natural monopoly, and therefore a
second competitor would not survive.
As early as 1900, it was clear that all telecommunications markets were not natural
monopolies, as evidenced from the existence of more than one competing firms in many
regional markets, prior to the absorption of most of them in the Bell System.  Over time, it
became clear that some markets that may have been natural monopolies in the past, are not
natural monopolies any more, and that it is better to allow competition in those markets
while keeping the rest regulated.
The market for telecommunication services and for telecommunications equipment
went through various stages of competitiveness since the invention of the telephone by
Alexander Graham Bell.  After a period of expansion and consolidation, by the 1920,
AT&T had an overwhelming majority of telephony exchanges and submitted to State
regulation.  Federal regulation was instituted by the 1934 Telecommunication Act which
established the Federal Communications Commission.
Regulation of the U.S. telecommunications market was marked by two important
antitrust lawsuits that the U.S. Department of Justice brought against AT&T.  In the first
                                         
3 The telecommunications sector is regulated both by the Federal Government through the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) and by all States, typically through a Public Utilities Commission
(“PUC”) or Public Service Commission.  Usually a PUC also regulates electricity companies.
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one, United States v. Western Electric, filed in 1949, the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) claimed that the Bell Operating Companies practiced illegal exclusion by buying
only from Western Electric, a part of the Bell System.  The government sought a
divestiture of Western Electric, but the case was settled in 1956 with AT&T agreeing not
to enter the computer market, but retaining ownership of Western Electric.
The second major antitrust suit, United States v. AT&T, was started in 1974.  The
government alleged that (i) AT&T’s relationship with Western Electric was illegal, and
(ii) that AT&T monopolized the long distance market.  The DOJ sought divestiture of
both manufacturing and long distance from local service.  The case was settled by the
Modified of Final Judgement (“MFJ”).  This decree broke away from AT&T seven
regional operating companies (“RBOCs”).  Each RBOC was comprised of a collection of
local telephone companies that were part of the original AT&T.  Regional Bell Operating
Companies remained regulated monopolies, each with an exclusive franchise in its region.
Microwave transmission was a major breakthrough in long distance transmission
that created the possibility of competition in long distance.  Microwave transmission was
followed by technological breakthroughs in transmission through satellite and through
fiberoptic wire.
The breakup of AT&T crystallized the recognition that competition was possible in
long distance, while the local market remained a natural monopoly.  The biggest benefits
to consumers during the last fifteen years have come from the long distance market,
which, during this period was transformed from a monopoly to an effectively competitive
market.  However, often consumers do not reap the full benefits of cost reductions and
competition because of an antiquated regulatory framework that, ironically, was supposed
12
to protect consumers from monopolistic abuses and instead protects the monopolistic
market structure.
Competi ion in long distance has been a great success.  The market share (in
minutes of use) of AT&T fell from almost 100% to 53% at the end of 1996.  Since the
MFJ, the number of competitors in the long distance market has increased dramatically.
There are four large facilities-based competitors, AT&T, MCI-WorldCom, Sprint, and
Frontier.4  There is also a large number of “resellers” that buy wholesale service from the
facilities-based long distance carriers and sell to consumers.  For example, currently, there
are about 500 resellers competing in the California interexchange market, providing very
strong evidence for the ease of entry into this market.  At least 20 new firms entered the
California market in each year since 1984.  At present, there are at least 5 “out of region”
RBOCs providing service in California through affiliates.  In California, the typical
consumer can choose from at least 150 long distance companies.
Prices of long distance phone calls have decreased dramatically.  The average
revenue per minute of AT&T’s switched services has been reduced by 62% between 1984
and 1996.  AT&T was declared “non-dominant” in the long distance market by the FCC in
1995. 5   Most economists agree that presently the long distance market is eff ctively
competitive.
Local telephone companies that came out of the Bell System (Regional Bell
Operating Companies, “RBOCs”) actively petitioned the U.S. Congress to be allowed to
enter the long distance market, from which they were excluded by the MFJ.  The MFJ
                                         
4 Frontier is a new name for Rochester Telephone.
5 See Federal Communications Commission (1995).
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prevented RBOCs from participation in long distance because of the anticompetitive
consequences that this would have for competition in long distance.  The anticompetitive
effects would arise because of the control by RBOCs of essential “bottleneck” inputs for
long distance services, such as terminating access of phone calls to customers that live in
the local companies to long distance companies, and are essential bottleneck inputs for
long distance service. RBOCs monopoly franchises.
A long distance phone call is carried by the local telephone companies of the place
it originates and the place it terminates, and only in its long distance part by a long
distance company.  Thus, “originating access” and “terminating access” are provided by
local exchange carriers to long distance companies and are essential bottleneck inputs for
long distance service.  Origination and termination of calls are extremely lucrative
services.6  Terminating access has an average cost (in most locations) of $0.002 per
minute.  Its regulated prices vary.  A typical price is $0.032 per minute, charged by NY
Telephone.  Such pricing implies a profit rate of 1500%.7  Access charges reform is one of
the key demands of the pro-competitive forces in the current deregulation process.
The great success of competition in long distance allowed US Congress to appear
“balanced” in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by establishing competition in local
telephony, while allowing RBOCs into long distance after they meet certain conditions.
However, the transition of local markets to effective competition will not be as easy or as
                                                                                                                   
6 These fees are the single largest cost item in the ledgers of AT&T.
7 Termination pricing varies.  Pacific Bell, under pressure from the California Public Utilities
Commission, now has an access charge of $0.016 per minute, giving it a profit rate of 700%.
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quick as in the long distance markets.  This is because of the nature of the product and the
associated economics.
Many telecommunications companies are presently trying to be in as many markets
as possible so that they can bundle the various products.  Companies believe that
consumers are willing to pay more for bundled services for which the consumer receives a
single bill.  Bundling also discourages consumers from migrating to competitors, who may
not offer the complete collection of services, so consumer “churn” is xpected to be
reduced.
3.3 Entry in Local Services as Envisioned by the Act
Currently, the “last mile” of the telecommunications network that is closest to the
consumer (the “local loop”) remains a bottleneck controlled by a local exchange carrier
(“LEC”).  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 boldly attempts to introduce competition
in this last bottleneck, and, before competition takes hold, the Act attempts to imitate
competition in the local exchange.
To facilitate entry in the local exchange, the Act introduces two novel ways of
entry besides entry through the installation of own facilities.  The first way allows entry in
the retailing part of the telecommunications business by requiring incumbent local
exchange carriers (“ILECs”) to sell at wholesale prices to entrants any retail service that
they offer.  Such entry is essentially limited to the retailing part of the market.
The second and most significant novel way of entry introduced by the Act is
through leasing of unbundled network elements from incumbents.  In particular, the Act
requires that ILECs (i) unbundle their networks; and (ii) that they offer for lease to
15
entrants network components (unbundled network elements, “UNEs”) “at cost plus
reasonable profit.”8  Thus, the Act envisions the telecommunications network as a
decentralized network of interconnected networks.
Many firms, including the large interexchange carriers AT&T and MCI-WorldCom
attempted to enter the market through “arbitration” agreements with ILECs under the
supervision of State Regulatory Commissions, according to the procedure outlined by the
Act.  The arbitration process proved to be extremely long and difficult, with continuous
legal obstacles and appeals raised by the ILECs.  To this date (April 1999), over three
years after the signing of the Act by President Clinton, arbitrations have been concluded in
few States, and entry in the local exchange has been minimal.
3.4 Entry of RBOCs in Long Distance Service
RBOCs (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, SBC and USWest) have 89% of
telephone access lines nationwide.  Most of the remainder belongs to GTE and
independent franchise holders.  Competitive access providers (who did not hold a
franchise monopoly) have less than 1% of residential access lines nationwide.  Besides
providing access to long distance companies, local exchange carriers also provide lucrative
“custom local exchange services” (CLASS), such as call waiting, conference calling, and
automatic number identification.  Basic local service provided by LECs is considered not
to be particularly profitable.
                                         
8 The FCC and State Regulatory Commissions have interpreted these words to mean Total Element
Long Run Incremental Cost (“TELRIC”) which is the forward looking, long run, (minimized) economic
cost of an unbundled element and includes the competitive return on capital.
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The Act allows for entry of RBOCs in long distance once a list of requirements has
been met, and the petitioner has proved that its proposal is in the public interest.  These
requirements can be met only when the market for local telecommunications services
becomes sufficiently competitive.  If the local market is not competitive when an
incumbent LEC monopolist enters into long distance, the LEC can leverage its monopoly
power to disadvantage its long distance rivals by increasing their costs in various ways,
and by discriminating against them in its pricing. If the local market is not competitive
when an incumbent LEC monopolist enters into long distance, an LLEC would control the
price of a required input (switched access) to long distance service while it would also
compete for customers in long distance.  Under these circumstances, an ILEC can
implement a vertical price squeeze on its long distance competitors whereby the price to
cost ratio of long distance competitors is squeezed so that they are driven out of business.9
In allowing entry of local exchange carriers into the long distance market, the Act
tries not to endanger competition that has developed in long distance by premature entry
of  RBOCs in the long distance market.  However, on this issue, the Act’s provisions
guarding against premature entry ma  be insufficient.  Hence, to guard against anti-
competitive consequences of premature entry of RBOCs in long distance there is a need of
a deeper analysis of the consequences of such entry on competition and on consumers’
and social welfare.
4. The Impact of Wireless (Cellular, Satellite and PCS) and of Cable Television
                                         
9 Avoiding a vertical price squeeze of long distance competitors, such as MCI, was a key rationale
for the 1981 breakup of AT&T in the long distance division that kept the AT&T name, and the seven
RBOCs that remained local monopolists in local service.  Se  Economides (1998), (1999).
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During the last fifteen years there has been a tremendous (and generally
unanticipated) expansion of the mobile phones market.  The very significant growth has
been limited by relatively high prices resulting from (i) the prevention of entry of more
than two competitors in each metropolitan areas; and (ii) the standard billing arrangement
that imposes a fee on the cellular customer for receiving (as well as initiating) calls.
However, during the last three years, the FCC has auctioned parts of the
electromagnetic spectrum that will enable the transmission of personal communication
services (“PCS”) signals.10  The auctioned spectrum will be able to support up to five
additional carriers in the major metropolitan markets.11 Although the PCS spectrum band
is different than the traditional cellular bands, PCS is predicted to be a low cost, high
quality, mobile alternative to traditional phone service.  Other wireless services may chip
away at the ILECs markets,  specially in high capacity access services.12  The increase in
the number of competitors has already created very significant decreases in prices of
mobile phone services.
By its nature, PCS is positioned between fixed local service and traditional wireless
(cellular) service.  Presently there is a very significant price difference between the two
                                                                                                                   
10 Despite this and other auctions of spectrum, the FCC does not have a coherent policy of efficient
allocation of electromagnetic spectrum.  For example, recently, the FCC gave for free huge chunks of
electromagnetic spectrum to exis ing TV stations so that they may provide high definition television.
Some of the recipients have publicly stated that they intend to use the spectrum to broadcast regular TV
channels and information services, rather than HDTV.
11 We don’t expect to see five entrants in all markets because laxity in the financial requirements of
bidders resulted in default of some of the high bidders in the PCS, prompting a significant dispute
regarding their financial and other obligations.
12 The so-called “wireless loop” proposes to bypass the ILECs cabling with much less outlay for
equipment.  Trials are underway to test certain portions of the radio spectrum where were originally set
aside for other applications: MMDS for “wireless cable” and LMDS as “cellular television.”
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services. Priced between the two, PCS will first draw consumers from cellular in large
cities, and later on will be a serious threat to fixed local service.  AT&T has recently
announced that it will use some of the spectrum that it acquired in the PCS auctions to
implement a fixed wireless service (“telepoint”), a close (and maybe superior) substitute to
fixed wire service.13
Industry analysts have been predicting the impending entry of cable television in
telephony for many years.  Despite numerous trials, such entry in traditional
telecommunications services has not materialized.  There are a number of reasons for this.
First, to provide telephone service, cable television providers needed to upgrade their
networks from analog to digital.  Second, they need to add switching.  Third, most of the
cable industry has taken a high debt load and is unable to make the required investments in
the short run.
If and when it is able to provide switching, cable television will have a significant
advantage over regular telephone lines.  Cable TV lines that reach the home have a
significantly higher bandwidth capacity than regular twisted pair lines.  This is not
important for regular voice telephony, but it is crucially important for applications on the
world wide web that require high bandwidth capacity.  Companies such as @home and
WebTV are utilizing this capacity to provide bundles of Internet and traditional TV
services.  Often these services do not allow for two-way communication but rather rely on
a telephone line for transmissions from the home to the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”)
which are expected to require only low bandwidth.  The merged AT&T –TCI plans to
                                         
13 The second impediment to wider use of mobile phones seems also likely to disappear.  On
January 26, 1998, AT&T announced that it will offer mobile service with billing of incoming calls to the
originator of the call.
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provide telephony, broadband video, and Internet services over the cable line to the home.
We discuss this in the next section on mergers.
5. The Current Wave of Mergers
These challenges have derailed the implementation process of the Act and have
increased significantly the uncertainty in the telecommunications sector.  Long distance
companies have been unable to enter the local exchange markets by leasing unbundled
network elements (“UNEs”), since the arbitration process that started in April 1996 has
resulted in final prices in only a handful of States.  No State has completed the
implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Only 15 of the 50 States have
adopted permanent prices for unbundled network elements.14
In the absence of final prices, given the uncertainty of the various legal
proceedings, and without final resolution on the issues of non-recurring costs and of the
electronic interface for switching local service customers across carriers, entry in the local
exchange through leasing of unbundled network elements has been minimal.  Moreover,
entry in the retailing part of the business through total service resale has also been
minimal, since the wholesale discounts have been small.
                                                                                                                   
14 These were Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.  Of the states that
have adopted permanent prices for UNEs, 5 are in the Bell Atlantic/ NYNEX territory (Delaware, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania).  Also note that only 4 states have adopted permanent
rates in arbitrations of entrants with GTE (Florida, Montana, Oregon, and Texas).  For more details see
Hubbard and Lehr (1998).
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In the absence of entry in the local exchange market as envisioned by the Act, the
major long distance companies are buying companies that give them some access to the
local market.
MCI merged with WorldCom, which had just merged with Brooks Fiber and MFS,
which in turn also own some infrastructure in local exchange markets.  MCI-WorldCom is
focusing on the Internet and the business long distance market.15
AT&T has acquired TCG, which owns local exchange infrastructure that reaches
business customers.  Recently AT&T has unveiled an ambitious strategy of reaching
consumers’ homes by using cable TV wires for the “last mile.”   With this purpose in
mind, AT&T bought TCI.  AT&T promises to convert the TCI cable access to an
interactive broadband, voice, and data telephone link to residences.  AT&T has also
entered in an agreement with Time Warner to use its cable connection in a way similar to
TCI’s.  On April 22, 1999, AT&T announced its bid for MediaOne, the cable spin-off of
US West which had earlier announced its merger with Comcast.
TCI cable presently reaches 35% of US households.  Together with Time Warner
and MediaOne, AT&T will reach a bit more than 50% of US households.  Without access
to UNEs, to reach all residential customers, AT&T would have to find another way to
reach the remaining US households.  Further cable conversions is one strategy that can
                                         
15 The MCI-WorldCom merger was challenged by the European Union Competition Committee,
the Department of Justice and GTE on the grounds that the merged company would have a large market
share of the Internet “backbone” and could sequentially target, degrade interconnection, and kill its
backbone rivals.  Despite (i) a lack of an economically meaningful definition of the Internet “backbone”;
(ii) the fact that MCI was unlikely to have such an incentive because any degradation would also hurt its
customers; and (iii) that it seemed unlikely that such degradation was feasible, the Competition
Commission of the European Union, ordered MCI to divest of all its Internet business, including its retail
business where it was never alleged that the merging companies had any monopoly power.   MCI’s
Internet business was sold to Cable and Wireless, the MCI-WorldCom merger was finalized, and MCI-
WorldCom is using its UUNET subsidiary to spearhead its way in the Internet.
21
accomplish this.  AT&T has also announced, but not yet implemented, a wireless telepoint
technology, similar to cellular mobile technology, but only suitable to immobile or slow-
moving receivers.
The provision of telephony, Internet access, broadband, data, and two-way video
services exclusively over cable lines in the “last mile” requires significant technical
advances, significant conversion of the present cable networks, and an investment of at
least $5 billion (and some say $30 billion) just for the conversion of the cable network to
two way, switched services.  Moreover, there is some inherent uncertainty in such a
conversion, which has not been successful in the past.  Thus, it is an expensive and
uncertain proposition for AT&T, but, at the same time, it is one of the few remaining
options of entry in the local exchange.
Meanwhile, Pacific Bell was acquired by SBC, and NYNEX by Bell Atlantic,
despite antitrust objections, in an attempt of the RBOCs to maximize their foothold,
looking forward to the time when they will be allowed to provide long distance service.
Recently, SBC bought Southern New England Telephone (“SNET”) one of the few
companies, which, as an independent (not part of AT&T at divestiture), was not bound by
MFJ restrictions and has already entered into long distance.
In 1998, two significant mergers were announced and are presently being reviewed
by antitrust and regulatory authorities.  Bell Atlantic announced its intention to merge with
GTE, and SBC has announced its intention to buy Ameritech.  If all the local exchange
carrier mergers pass antitrust and regulatory scrutiny, the 8 large local exchange carriers
of 1984 (7 RBOCs and GTE) would be reduced to only 4: Bell Atlantic, Bell South, SBC,
and US West.  The smaller ones, Bell South and US West already feel the pressure, and
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have been widely reported to be in merger/acquisition talks with a number of parties.
Recently, BellSouth announced a pact with Qwest to sell Qwest’s long distance service
once BellSouth is allowed to sell long distance service.
Recently, the DOJ conditionally approved the SBC-Ameritech merger, and the
FCC announced its own requirements to approve the merger.  However, the GTE-Bell
Atlantic merger may be much harder to approve since this merger may allow the combined
entity to bypass existing rules.  GTE is already providing long distance service since it was
not part of AT&T and is not bound by the MFJ restrictions.  On the other hand, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, amending the MFJ, prohibits Bell Atlantic from offering
long distance service until a number of conditions are met and Bell Atlantic shows that its
entry into long distance is in the public interest.  I cannot see the Bell Atlantic – GTE
merger clearing the DOJ unless GTE spins-off its long distance voice and data assets.  If
the Bell Atlantic-GTE merger is approved without such a condition, the combined entity
can engage in a vertical price squeeze, cross subsidization and raising rivals costs – all the
reasons that lead to the prohibitions of the MFJ and the 1996 Act.
6. The Coming World
The intent of the 1996 Act was to promote competition and the public interest.  It
will be a significant failure of the US political, legal, and regulatory systems if the interests
of entrenched monopolists rather than the public interest as expressed by the US Congress
dictate the future of the US telecommunications sector.  The market structure in the
telecommunications sector two years ahead will depend crucially on the resolution of the
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LECs legal challenges to the 1996 Telecommunications Act and its final implementation.16
Already, we have seen significant vertical integration into the cable industry as AT&T
found it extremely difficult to enter the local exchange market.
Whatever the outcomes of the legal battles, the existence of arbitrage and the
intensification of competition necessitate cost-based pricing and will create tremendous
pressure on traditional regulated prices that are not cost-based.  Prices that are not based
on cost will prove unsustainable.  This includes access changes that LECs charge to IXCs,
which have to become cost-based if the vision of a competitive network of interconnected
networks is to b e realized.
Computers are likely to play a bigger role as telephone appliances and in running
intermediate size networks that will compete with LECs and intensify the arbitrage among
IXCs.  Computer-based telephone interfaces will become the norm.  Firms that have
significant market share in computer interfaces, such as Microsoft, may play a significant
role in telephony.17  Hardware manufacturers, especially firms like Cisco, Intel, and 3Com,
that make switches and local networks, will play a much more central role in telephony.
Internet telephony (voice, data, and broadband) is expected to grow fast.
                                         
16 In one of the major challenges, GTE and a number of RBOCs appealed (among others) the FCC
(1996) rules on pricing guidelines to the 8th Circuit.  The plaintiffs won the appeal; the FCC appealed to
the Supreme Court, which ruled on January 25, 1999.  The plaintiffs claimed (among others) that (i) the
FCC’s rules on the definition of unbundled network elements were flawed; (ii) that the FCC “default
prices” for leasing of UNEs were so low that they amounted to confiscation of ILEC property; and (iii)
that FCC’s “pick and choose” rule allowing a carrier to demand access to any individual interconnection,
service, or network element arrangement on the same terms and conditions the LEC has given anyone else
in an approved local competition entry agreement without having to accept the agreement's other
provisions would deter the “voluntarily negotiated agreements.”  The Supreme Court ruled for the FCC in
all these points, thereby eliminating a major challenge to the implementation of the Act.
17 Microsoft owns a share of WebTV and has made an investment in Qwest.
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Finally, I expect that, slowly but steadily, telecommunications will drift away from
the technical standards of signalling system seven (“SS7”) established by AT&T before its
breakup.  As different methods of transmission and switching take a foothold, and as new
interfaces become available, wars over technical standards are very likely.18  This will
further transform telecommunications from the traditional quiet landscape of regulated
utilities to the mad dash world of software and computer manufacturing.  This change will
create significant business opportunities for entrants and impose significant challenges on
traditional telecommunications carriers.
                                         
18 A significant failure of the FCC has been its absence in defining technical standards and
promoting compatibility.  Even when the FCC had a unique opportunity to define such standards in PCS
telephony (since it could define the terms while it auctioned spectrum), it allowed a number of
incompatible standards to co-exist for PCS service.  This lead directly to a weakening of competition and
higher prices wireless PCS consumers have to buy a new appliance to migrate across providers.
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